Iraq will go to the new era After American's troop withdrawl,a few days before the Iraqi parliament passed the Iraqi-American security agreement- US President George Bush surprised
the world by admitting his regret for not ensuring the accuracy of the intelligence that claimed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. He said in an interview on ABC that the intelligence failure in Iraq was a source of deep regret for his administration, adding that he wished the intelligence agency's performance had been better. He refused to commit, however, as to whether he would have waged a war against Iraq if he had been sure that it did not possess weapons of mass destruction. We can, nonetheless, interpret his response to be an indirect affirmation, as he considered war against destructive ideologies to be one of the most important accomplishments of his administration.
Other key figures in the Bush Administration also reinforced the idea that the U.S. would have invaded Iraq in any case. Allen Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, acknowledged that controlling Iraqi oil was one of the main reasons for waging a war against Iraq. And Scott McClellan, the Bush White House Press Secretary, said in his recently published book, that the Bush administration was not transparent regarding its real goals for invading and occupying Iraq. He said that the US administration invested more than 600 billion dollars in Iraq, and that it lost four thousand soldiers in addition to the injury of another thirty thousand. These sacrifices were made to obtain control of the country and its resources and in order to occupy it for the next several decades. Iraqi oil reserves are estimated at 350 billion barrels, double the oil reserves in Saudi Arabia.
But oil was only one of many reasons for the Iraq invasion. There were also political and strategic reasons related to US interests in the Middle East, especially concerning Israel, which justified the destruction of Iraq as a power that could have impeded these interests.
Tehran and Washington: Different Stances
It was logical for the Bush administration to impose the Strategic Convention and the Security Agreement on Iraq in order to establish a new phase of US control of Iraq, as the mandate of the coalition forces there ended on the 31st of December 2008.
It was also logical that the US administration should seek to exert all forms of pressure to get an agreement that serves its interests. In the “Declaration of Principles”, Washington talked about a long-term relationship between Iraq and the United States. Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador in Iraq, warned that without the agreement, U.S. troops would remain inactive, without providing training or logistical support. The US commander in Iraq, George Casey, also warned that without the agreement, the Iraqi security forces would disintegrate, because the Iraqi ground, air and naval forces depend completely on US support. He also threatened that Washington would reduce its military assistance (6.3 billion dollars), arms sales (10 billion dollars), security cooperation, assistance in maintenance of military vehicles as well as reduce the number of contractors which is estimated at 200 thousand personnel.
Hoshiar Zeibary, the Iraqi foreign minister, confirmed these threats in an interview to the BBC , stating that the U.S. told the Iraqi government that they would halt all training, support, construction and economic projects in Iraq in the event that the Iraqis did not finalize the agreement before the end of 2008.
Bush and the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed the “Declaration of Principles” in August 2007 before it was confirmed by the Iraqi Parliament. And until the latter ratified it on the 27th of November 2008, the US administration was constantly exerting pressure on Iraq to pass it before the end of Bush's presidential term. Some hoped that the agreement would be passed before the 2008 US presidential elections so that it could be used to augment the position of Republican presidential nominee John McCain.
Since this agreement was important to the US for political, economic and strategic reasons, Washington was forced to make concessions to the Iraqis. The agreement represents three strategic gains for the US: 1) The ability to use Iraq as a security base to face any possible security threats from militants such as Al-Qaeda and Hizbullah, or from countries such as Syria or Iran; 2) A guarantee of the continuous flow of oil from the Middle East, and the increased security of Israel; and 3) A means to ensure that in the future, Iraq would not break the rules of the regional and international game as defined by Washington.
Iran tried to prevent the signing of the agreement, but when it failed to do so, it directed its efforts towards two goals: 1) preventing Washington from establishing a military, political, and economic presence in Iraq that would interfere with its own political ambitions there, and 2) ensuring that US forces would not be able to wage an attack on Iran from Iraqi soil.
Iran hoped it could keep US forces in an insecure situation in Iraq for as long as possible. The strong US military presence in Iraq would prevent the U.S. from launching an attack on Iran as it would be difficult for Washington to open a third war front considering the difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran exploited US problems in Iraq to expand its regional influence and as a bargaining card in its standoff with the US regarding its nuclear program. In other words, Iran could use its influence in Iraq to provide the US with an honorable exit, in return for reaching an understanding regarding its nuclear program.
Because of Iran’s vehement opposition, Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, was forced to go to Tehran to pledge that the agreement would prohibit the US from attacking Iran from Iraqi soil. He also pledged to get the forces of the Iranian opposition movement Mogahedi Khalq or the “People's Fighters” out of Iraq. In addition, al-Maliki signed a cooperation agreement with Iran, similar to the one he previously signed with Turkey.
These Iraqi initiatives failed to reassure Iran or bring about a shift in its position. So, Iranian allies in the Iraqi government continually pushed for new amendments to reduce U.S. gains, and create a balance between Iranian and U.S. interests in Iraq.
Changes in Iran’s Position:
Following the victory of Barak Obama in the presidential elections, Iran’s position underwent a change. Ali Larigani, the speaker of the upper chamber in the Iranian parliament, said that the agreement “has some problems', a deliberately minimalist and vague comment.
This statement clearly represented a change in the Iranian position, and revealed that the efforts to sabotage the agreement had failed. There are three reasons that explain the transformation from a clear rejection to a vague acceptance, reflecting the pragmatism of Iranian politics.
The first relates to Iran’s political influence in Iraq if the U.S. had withdrawn and no agreement had been signed. Washington successfully played on the fears of the ruling Shiite-Kurdish coalition, as well as Iran’s fears, that this coalition could not survive for one day following a withdrawal of U.S. troops. The continued presence of U.S. troops was necessary to maintain the basic pillars of Iraq- established by the U.S. and acceptable to Iran. These include the Iraqi constitution, which was supervised by Paul Bremer, and the acceptance of federalism as a principle of governance in Iraq.
Iran’s awareness of this danger was the main reason for its implicit acceptance of the agreement. It ensured the continued hold on power by Iran's allies, enabling Iran to defend its own interests in Iraq.
Secondly, Iran deemed it extremely important to prevent a US or Israeli attack on its nuclear program. Iran aspired to open a new page in its relations with the United States under the new administration, as Obama had pledged during his campaign to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq within 18 months. He also promised to start a dialogue with Iran, in order to arrange an honorable withdrawal from Iraq. He even suggested that a successful dialogue regarding Iraq would open the door to another positive dialogue about the Iranian nuclear program. Iran therefore made a number of goodwill gestures towards the U.S., including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's unprecedented letter to Obama, in which he said that the peoples of the world look forward to clear and fundamental changes in domestic and foreign U.S. policies.
Tehran, anxious to open a dialogue with the US, accompanied this message by a number of other gestures, including the report by Fars news agency refuting U.S. accusations that Ahmadinejad was one of the students who occupied the U.S. embassy and held U.S. hostages for 444 days in 1979.
Iran’s acceptance of the security agreement in Iraq was justified by the Iranian press. For example, the Iranian newspaper Sada Adalat or “Voice of Justice”, on the 30th of November 2008, outlined the reasons that compelled the Iraqi government to accept the agreement, which included the amendments such as the change of its title from “The Security Agreement” to 'The Agreement of the American Troops' Withdrawal From Iraq', setting a date for the withdrawal by the end of 2011, formation of a joint Iraqi-American committee to study the issue of legal immunity of U.S. soldiers, and U.S. assurances that it would not use Iraqi soil as a base from which to launch attacks on any neighboring country.
The third reason Iran was willing to accept this agreement was its need to contain strong Israeli pressures on the new U.S. administration, as Tel Aviv sensed the threat of a possible U.S.-Iranian dialogue. Israeli pressures had already succeeded in forcing Obama to severely criticize Iran and demand that it discontinue its support for terrorist organizations, while asking the international community to exert every effort to stop it.
Iran was aware of the fact that Israel would not relent after the Bush administration dispensed with the idea of military action as the solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. This was demonstrated when Israeli officials warned Washington against retreating from military action, pledging not to allow Iran to get away with its nuclear program. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz published some information leaked from a secret document containing a security assessment presented to the Israeli cabinet. The document presented an overview of the regional situation, and the relative balance of power and positions of the various regional players, including Iran. It recommended that Israel be ready to attack Iran, alleging that Tehran is close to possessing nuclear weapons and which would increase its regional reach. The document regarded Iranian missiles as a 'strategic threat' to Israel, and concluded that Israel is forced to confront this threat alone. Israel must therefore be prepared to take military action on its own. The analysis predicted that a dialogue between Iran and the United States could result in an agreement between the two countries. To avoid such an outcome, the document stressed the importance of exerting influence in Washington to derail any arrangement that would adversely affect Israel.
Iran’s knowledge of Israel's plans compelled Tehran to make some conciliatory gestures toward the new US administration. Tehran therefore endorsed the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement in order to save its political allies in Iraq, as well as to open a dialogue with Washington to resolve US-Iranian nuclear issues without military confrontation, and finally to establish a new regional partnership with Iraq.
Iraq and the Prospect of U.S.-Iranian Relations
It is well known that Iraq’s future and stability depend, to a large extent, on US-Iranian relations. But will the security agreement open the door for a continued dialogue between Washington and Tehran, as Obama previously promised, or will the new U.S. national security team put pressure on Obama to take a confrontational stance towards Iran?
The answer is not certain as there are foundations for both cooperation and mistrust between the two countries. If Obama's priorities are in fact ending the war in Iraq, concentrating on the war on terrorism and Al Qaeda and ensuring that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons-- then he will try to maintain stability in Iraq and withdraw US troops, in order to redirect resources to the war in Afghanistan.
A U.S.–Iranian understanding in Iraq could benefit both countries by increasing Iraqi stability. Resalet newspaper or 'The Message' introduced some of these questions on the 1st of December 2008, in which it described the security agreement as 'the document of the American mandate in Iraq'. It also included four important remarks on the agreement (11): 1) The U.S. maintains the right to defend itself, which contradicts the UN convention that prevents any country from maintaining that right while occupying another country. This right can be manipulated, as it has been, to violate the rights of Iraqi citizens. 2) The U.S. maintains the right to build increasing numbers of military and strategic bases in Iraq. Although the U.S. pledged to leave Iraqi cities and villages by 2009 and Iraq itself by 2011, the agreement, nonetheless, upheld the U.S. right to add to its military and strategic bases. According to the U.S., it will keep 16 bases throughout Iraq. 3) The agreement prevents the U.S. from attacking neighboring countries from Iraqi soil, but it does not prevent Washington from carrying out intelligence operations against neighboring countries, as in the case of Syria last year. 4) The agreement gives U.S. troops the right to bring in equipment and weapons without any inspections, customs or legal supervision, which violates Iraqi law. It also allows the US to import advanced weaponry into the country that would help maintain its occupation of Iraq.
These remarks show Iranian recognition of the threat that this security agreement brings. This may compel Tehran to try to destabilize U.S. control of Iraq.
the world by admitting his regret for not ensuring the accuracy of the intelligence that claimed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. He said in an interview on ABC that the intelligence failure in Iraq was a source of deep regret for his administration, adding that he wished the intelligence agency's performance had been better. He refused to commit, however, as to whether he would have waged a war against Iraq if he had been sure that it did not possess weapons of mass destruction. We can, nonetheless, interpret his response to be an indirect affirmation, as he considered war against destructive ideologies to be one of the most important accomplishments of his administration.
Other key figures in the Bush Administration also reinforced the idea that the U.S. would have invaded Iraq in any case. Allen Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve, acknowledged that controlling Iraqi oil was one of the main reasons for waging a war against Iraq. And Scott McClellan, the Bush White House Press Secretary, said in his recently published book, that the Bush administration was not transparent regarding its real goals for invading and occupying Iraq. He said that the US administration invested more than 600 billion dollars in Iraq, and that it lost four thousand soldiers in addition to the injury of another thirty thousand. These sacrifices were made to obtain control of the country and its resources and in order to occupy it for the next several decades. Iraqi oil reserves are estimated at 350 billion barrels, double the oil reserves in Saudi Arabia.
But oil was only one of many reasons for the Iraq invasion. There were also political and strategic reasons related to US interests in the Middle East, especially concerning Israel, which justified the destruction of Iraq as a power that could have impeded these interests.
Tehran and Washington: Different Stances
It was logical for the Bush administration to impose the Strategic Convention and the Security Agreement on Iraq in order to establish a new phase of US control of Iraq, as the mandate of the coalition forces there ended on the 31st of December 2008.
It was also logical that the US administration should seek to exert all forms of pressure to get an agreement that serves its interests. In the “Declaration of Principles”, Washington talked about a long-term relationship between Iraq and the United States. Ryan Crocker, the U.S. ambassador in Iraq, warned that without the agreement, U.S. troops would remain inactive, without providing training or logistical support. The US commander in Iraq, George Casey, also warned that without the agreement, the Iraqi security forces would disintegrate, because the Iraqi ground, air and naval forces depend completely on US support. He also threatened that Washington would reduce its military assistance (6.3 billion dollars), arms sales (10 billion dollars), security cooperation, assistance in maintenance of military vehicles as well as reduce the number of contractors which is estimated at 200 thousand personnel.
Hoshiar Zeibary, the Iraqi foreign minister, confirmed these threats in an interview to the BBC , stating that the U.S. told the Iraqi government that they would halt all training, support, construction and economic projects in Iraq in the event that the Iraqis did not finalize the agreement before the end of 2008.
Bush and the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki signed the “Declaration of Principles” in August 2007 before it was confirmed by the Iraqi Parliament. And until the latter ratified it on the 27th of November 2008, the US administration was constantly exerting pressure on Iraq to pass it before the end of Bush's presidential term. Some hoped that the agreement would be passed before the 2008 US presidential elections so that it could be used to augment the position of Republican presidential nominee John McCain.
Since this agreement was important to the US for political, economic and strategic reasons, Washington was forced to make concessions to the Iraqis. The agreement represents three strategic gains for the US: 1) The ability to use Iraq as a security base to face any possible security threats from militants such as Al-Qaeda and Hizbullah, or from countries such as Syria or Iran; 2) A guarantee of the continuous flow of oil from the Middle East, and the increased security of Israel; and 3) A means to ensure that in the future, Iraq would not break the rules of the regional and international game as defined by Washington.
Iran tried to prevent the signing of the agreement, but when it failed to do so, it directed its efforts towards two goals: 1) preventing Washington from establishing a military, political, and economic presence in Iraq that would interfere with its own political ambitions there, and 2) ensuring that US forces would not be able to wage an attack on Iran from Iraqi soil.
Iran hoped it could keep US forces in an insecure situation in Iraq for as long as possible. The strong US military presence in Iraq would prevent the U.S. from launching an attack on Iran as it would be difficult for Washington to open a third war front considering the difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran exploited US problems in Iraq to expand its regional influence and as a bargaining card in its standoff with the US regarding its nuclear program. In other words, Iran could use its influence in Iraq to provide the US with an honorable exit, in return for reaching an understanding regarding its nuclear program.
Because of Iran’s vehement opposition, Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, was forced to go to Tehran to pledge that the agreement would prohibit the US from attacking Iran from Iraqi soil. He also pledged to get the forces of the Iranian opposition movement Mogahedi Khalq or the “People's Fighters” out of Iraq. In addition, al-Maliki signed a cooperation agreement with Iran, similar to the one he previously signed with Turkey.
These Iraqi initiatives failed to reassure Iran or bring about a shift in its position. So, Iranian allies in the Iraqi government continually pushed for new amendments to reduce U.S. gains, and create a balance between Iranian and U.S. interests in Iraq.
Changes in Iran’s Position:
Following the victory of Barak Obama in the presidential elections, Iran’s position underwent a change. Ali Larigani, the speaker of the upper chamber in the Iranian parliament, said that the agreement “has some problems', a deliberately minimalist and vague comment.
This statement clearly represented a change in the Iranian position, and revealed that the efforts to sabotage the agreement had failed. There are three reasons that explain the transformation from a clear rejection to a vague acceptance, reflecting the pragmatism of Iranian politics.
The first relates to Iran’s political influence in Iraq if the U.S. had withdrawn and no agreement had been signed. Washington successfully played on the fears of the ruling Shiite-Kurdish coalition, as well as Iran’s fears, that this coalition could not survive for one day following a withdrawal of U.S. troops. The continued presence of U.S. troops was necessary to maintain the basic pillars of Iraq- established by the U.S. and acceptable to Iran. These include the Iraqi constitution, which was supervised by Paul Bremer, and the acceptance of federalism as a principle of governance in Iraq.
Iran’s awareness of this danger was the main reason for its implicit acceptance of the agreement. It ensured the continued hold on power by Iran's allies, enabling Iran to defend its own interests in Iraq.
Secondly, Iran deemed it extremely important to prevent a US or Israeli attack on its nuclear program. Iran aspired to open a new page in its relations with the United States under the new administration, as Obama had pledged during his campaign to withdraw U.S. troops from Iraq within 18 months. He also promised to start a dialogue with Iran, in order to arrange an honorable withdrawal from Iraq. He even suggested that a successful dialogue regarding Iraq would open the door to another positive dialogue about the Iranian nuclear program. Iran therefore made a number of goodwill gestures towards the U.S., including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's unprecedented letter to Obama, in which he said that the peoples of the world look forward to clear and fundamental changes in domestic and foreign U.S. policies.
Tehran, anxious to open a dialogue with the US, accompanied this message by a number of other gestures, including the report by Fars news agency refuting U.S. accusations that Ahmadinejad was one of the students who occupied the U.S. embassy and held U.S. hostages for 444 days in 1979.
Iran’s acceptance of the security agreement in Iraq was justified by the Iranian press. For example, the Iranian newspaper Sada Adalat or “Voice of Justice”, on the 30th of November 2008, outlined the reasons that compelled the Iraqi government to accept the agreement, which included the amendments such as the change of its title from “The Security Agreement” to 'The Agreement of the American Troops' Withdrawal From Iraq', setting a date for the withdrawal by the end of 2011, formation of a joint Iraqi-American committee to study the issue of legal immunity of U.S. soldiers, and U.S. assurances that it would not use Iraqi soil as a base from which to launch attacks on any neighboring country.
The third reason Iran was willing to accept this agreement was its need to contain strong Israeli pressures on the new U.S. administration, as Tel Aviv sensed the threat of a possible U.S.-Iranian dialogue. Israeli pressures had already succeeded in forcing Obama to severely criticize Iran and demand that it discontinue its support for terrorist organizations, while asking the international community to exert every effort to stop it.
Iran was aware of the fact that Israel would not relent after the Bush administration dispensed with the idea of military action as the solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. This was demonstrated when Israeli officials warned Washington against retreating from military action, pledging not to allow Iran to get away with its nuclear program. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz published some information leaked from a secret document containing a security assessment presented to the Israeli cabinet. The document presented an overview of the regional situation, and the relative balance of power and positions of the various regional players, including Iran. It recommended that Israel be ready to attack Iran, alleging that Tehran is close to possessing nuclear weapons and which would increase its regional reach. The document regarded Iranian missiles as a 'strategic threat' to Israel, and concluded that Israel is forced to confront this threat alone. Israel must therefore be prepared to take military action on its own. The analysis predicted that a dialogue between Iran and the United States could result in an agreement between the two countries. To avoid such an outcome, the document stressed the importance of exerting influence in Washington to derail any arrangement that would adversely affect Israel.
Iran’s knowledge of Israel's plans compelled Tehran to make some conciliatory gestures toward the new US administration. Tehran therefore endorsed the U.S.-Iraqi security agreement in order to save its political allies in Iraq, as well as to open a dialogue with Washington to resolve US-Iranian nuclear issues without military confrontation, and finally to establish a new regional partnership with Iraq.
Iraq and the Prospect of U.S.-Iranian Relations
It is well known that Iraq’s future and stability depend, to a large extent, on US-Iranian relations. But will the security agreement open the door for a continued dialogue between Washington and Tehran, as Obama previously promised, or will the new U.S. national security team put pressure on Obama to take a confrontational stance towards Iran?
The answer is not certain as there are foundations for both cooperation and mistrust between the two countries. If Obama's priorities are in fact ending the war in Iraq, concentrating on the war on terrorism and Al Qaeda and ensuring that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons-- then he will try to maintain stability in Iraq and withdraw US troops, in order to redirect resources to the war in Afghanistan.
A U.S.–Iranian understanding in Iraq could benefit both countries by increasing Iraqi stability. Resalet newspaper or 'The Message' introduced some of these questions on the 1st of December 2008, in which it described the security agreement as 'the document of the American mandate in Iraq'. It also included four important remarks on the agreement (11): 1) The U.S. maintains the right to defend itself, which contradicts the UN convention that prevents any country from maintaining that right while occupying another country. This right can be manipulated, as it has been, to violate the rights of Iraqi citizens. 2) The U.S. maintains the right to build increasing numbers of military and strategic bases in Iraq. Although the U.S. pledged to leave Iraqi cities and villages by 2009 and Iraq itself by 2011, the agreement, nonetheless, upheld the U.S. right to add to its military and strategic bases. According to the U.S., it will keep 16 bases throughout Iraq. 3) The agreement prevents the U.S. from attacking neighboring countries from Iraqi soil, but it does not prevent Washington from carrying out intelligence operations against neighboring countries, as in the case of Syria last year. 4) The agreement gives U.S. troops the right to bring in equipment and weapons without any inspections, customs or legal supervision, which violates Iraqi law. It also allows the US to import advanced weaponry into the country that would help maintain its occupation of Iraq.
These remarks show Iranian recognition of the threat that this security agreement brings. This may compel Tehran to try to destabilize U.S. control of Iraq.
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